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Credit rating agencies have been widely criticized to issue inflated ratings due 
to the issuer-pay business model. This thesis analyses the credit rating 
standards and tests whether reputation concerns are powerful enough to 
discipline the rating agencies. I argue that due to rating agencies' distorted 
incentives, credit ratings are more likely to be inflated when corporate bond 
investors are more risk-averse and the slope of corporate bond credit-yield 
curve is higher. The empirical study using a large dataset of credit ratings from 
1985 to 2011 verifies such hypothesis and suggests that reputation concerns 
are not always powerful enough to serve as a self-disciplining mechanism. 
Besides, I find that the sensitivity of credit ratings on the slope of corporate 
bond credit-yield curve is higher for complex firms as well as risky firms. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The credit rating agencies 1  (CRAs) play an important role as financial 
intermediations in the modern financial system. By releasing the credit ratings, 
CRAs reduce the asymmetric information between the investors and issuers of 
various financial products. In practice, investors rely on credit ratings for the 
pricing of different securities (Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand, 
Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992), Goh and Ederington (1993)). On the other 
hand, credit ratings also affect firms' financial decisions such as capital 
structure or dividend pay-outs, as shown by Kisgen (2006, 2009), Hovakimian, 
Kayhan, and Titman (2009) as well as the survey study of Graham and Harvey 
(2001). It is common for companies to structure financing transactions to 
reflect rating criteria so they qualify for higher ratings. More importantly, 
ratings serve as a key factor in many regulations2.  Therefore accurate and 
stable credit ratings are called for by various market participants and CRAs are 
among the most powerful voices in today's capital markets.  
Despite their critical role, the CRAs have often been criticized for revealing 
biased information to the investors. Overdependence on the credit ratings is 
even regarded as a primary cause of the most recent financial and economic 
crisis (Partnoy (2009)). At the heart of these criticisms lies the issuer-pay 
business model adopted by major CRAs. Until the early 1970s, CRAs mainly 
earned their income by selling publications and other related materials to 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, credit rating agencies mainly refer to the for-profit sell-side rating agencies. 
Duan and van Laere (2012) gives a more detailed explanation on the difference between buy-
side and sell-side rating agencies.  
2 For example, the Federal Reserve Board allows members of the Federal Reserve System to 
invest in securities rated in the four highest rating categories. The Department of Labor allows 
pension funds to invest in commercial paper rated in one of the three highest categories. The 
New York and Philadelphia stock exchanges fix margin requirements for mortgage securities 
depending on their ratings. 
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investors. With the development of photocopying technology in the seventies, 
however, it became dramatically difficult for such investor-pay model to 
prevent the free-riding and information leaking problem (Randhawa (2011)). 
Thus the rating industry switched to charging the companies they rate, which 
creates the conflicts of interest. Such issuer-pay model is still employed by 
most of the CRAs nowadays. It has raised concerns that the incentives of the 
CRAs are distorted, which leads them to issue more favorable ratings to 
attract/retain clients. Moreover, the failure to predict the Asian financial crisis, 
the slow movement of rating adjustments before the bankruptcies of Enron, 
Lehman Brothers and MF Global3, as well as the frequent downgrades of 
structured credit products during the recent sub-prime crisis have caused a 
series of investigations and regulatory proposals to reform the rating industry. 
In response to the criticisms for their conflicts of interest, the CRAs always 
defend themselves with a counterargument of having an incentive to build and 
protect their reputations for being independent and objective. For example, 
Standard & Poor's (S&P) claimed that “reputation is more important than 
revenues.” Moody's CEO Raymond McDaniel stated that “we are in a 
business where reputational capital is more important.” Former executive VP 
of Moody's Thomas McGuire stated that “what's driving us is primarily the 
issue of preserving our track record. That's our bread and butter.” As a 
consequence, there is always a debate whether CRAs favor issuer interests or 
investor interests. Theoretically speaking, the CRAs are confronted with the 
trade-off between their expected compensation, which entices them to inflate 
credit ratings, and the potential reputation loss arising from future defaults. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Risk Management Institute (2012) for a detailed analysis. 
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They will only be self-disciplined if the reputation concerns outweigh the 
increased expected income from rating inflation. This paper thus investigates 
whether such reputation concerns are always powerful enough to discipline the 
rating agencies.  
The literature on credit ratings grows quickly in the recent years. Several 
recent theoretical works make predictions regarding the cyclical pattern of 
rating standards. For example, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) establish a 
model with both trusting and sophisticated investors. They argue that CRAs 
are more prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of trusting 
investors in the market who take ratings at face value. To the extent that in 
booms the fraction of trusting investors is higher, their model predicts that 
CRAs are more likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. 
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2012) consider the labor market competition for credit 
risk analysts. In boom periods, the outside options of current and prospective 
employees improve substantially, making it more difficult and expensive for a 
CRA to maintain the same quality of analyst resources. Therefore, they argue 
that ratings quality is lower in booms and improves in recessions. Both of the 
above works as well as Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) show that 
there could be equilibriums under which the CRAs would inflate the credit 
ratings.  
A number of recent empirical studies examine the credit ratings for structured 
credit products. Based on a sample of mortgage backed securities deals issued 
between 2001 and 2007, Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) 
find evidence of time variation in risk adjusted credit ratings, including a 
progressive decline in standards around the MBS market peak. Analysing a 
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sample of CDOs issued from 1997 to 2007, Griffin and Tang (2012) find that 
a CRA frequently made positive adjustments beyond its main quantitative 
model. He, Qian, and Strahan (2011) find evidence of rating shopping and 
potential conflicts of interest using a sample of mortgage-backed securities. 
The empirical evidence on corporate issuer ratings and bond ratings are, 
however, mixed. On the positive side, Covitz and Harrison (2003) find that 
rating changes do not appear to be importantly influenced by CRAs' conflicts 
of interest and suggest that CRAs are motivated primarily by reputation 
related incentives. A shortcoming of their study is that the data only spans a 
short period from 1997 to 2002. Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) argue that CRAs 
not only improve rating timeliness, but also increase rating accuracy and 
reduce rating volatility in response to regulatory pressure and investor 
criticism for their ratings' lack of timeliness. Several studies document that 
credit ratings are declining over the past thirty years by holding firm 
characteristics constant. One possible explanation for such declining ratings is 
that CRAs are being more stringent as argued by Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay 
(1998), Alp (2011), Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2012). Jorion, Shi, and 
Zhang (2009), however, claim that the apparent tightening of rating standards 
can be attributed primarily to changes in accounting quality over time. On the 
negative side, Becker and Milbourn (2011) find that increased competition 
from Fitch coincides with lower quality ratings from the incumbents: S&P and 
Moody's. Rating levels went up, the correlation between ratings and market-
implied yields fell, and the ability of ratings to predict default deteriorated. 
Kraft (2010) studies the use of credit ratings in debt contracts. The author 
finds that CRAs are more likely to cater to borrowers when performance 
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pricing agreements in debt contracts rely on credit ratings rather than 
accounting ratios due to increased pressure from the borrowers. 
Strobl and Xia (2011) is closely related to this paper. Using a unique dataset, 
the authors compare credit ratings based on the issuer-pay rating model with 
those based on the investor-pay model 4  and find that when the expected 
compensation is high, the issuer-pay based CRAs assign a more favorable 
rating to the issuer. Such finding is robust to several different measures of 
expected compensation and reveals the conflicts of interest induced by the 
issuer-pay rating model. 
Differing from Strobl and Xia (2011) which study the cross-sectional 
difference of credit ratings, this paper focuses on the time series pattern of 
rating standards and provides some insights on the research question: when are 
CRAs most likely to inflate ratings if the reputation concerns are not always 
powerful enough to serve as a self-disciplining mechanism? I formalize the 
trade-off for a CRA between the expected compensation from rating new bond 
issuances and the reputation cost in case that firms with inflated ratings default. 
Since the issuing company would be required to offer higher return by the 
investors if the CRA assigns a low rating, the firm might delay its investment 
or resort to other channels to finance the project. If the rating is not 
satisfactory, the company cancels the bond issuance and does not need to pay 
any rating fees. As a result, the CRA would always have the incentives to 
issue more favorable ratings to the potential issuer. On the other hand, if a 
company with high rating fails, the investors may doubt the CRA's integrity 
                                                 
4  Although the issuer-pay model dominates in the rating industry nowadays, Egan-Jones 
Rating Agency still employs the investor-pay business model. 
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which leads to a reputation damage and loss of future business. Such 
countervailing force will mitigate the incentive to inflate ratings if the 
reputation cost is large enough. 
A major difference between this paper and previous ones is that it takes the 
time-varying feature of expected compensation for CRAs into consideration. 
When corporate bond credit-yield curve5 is steep, bond market investors are 
more risk-averse and require much higher return for risky projects than the 
safe ones. Therefore, bond issuance cost would increase significantly if the 
issuing company were assigned a rating lower than what is expected. As a 
consequence, the likelihood that companies with unsatisfactory ratings 
cancelling their potential bond issuances becomes much higher given the steep 
credit-yield curve and the CRAs could lose huge amount of business if they 
still conduct rating rigorously. In order to secure their income, CRAs are more 
likely to inflate the ratings in such condition but become relatively more 
stringent otherwise if the reputation concerns are not always powerful enough. 
Therefore, a direct testable hypothesis is that credit ratings tend to be higher 
when the corporate bond credit-yield curve is steep after controlling 
everything else. Any evidence supporting such hypothesis could suggest that 
CRAs cannot always be disciplined by the reputation concerns.  
To test such hypothesis, I employ two different datasets of credit ratings for 
the period 1985 to 2011. The first dataset contains the S&P’s corporate credit 
ratings provided by Compustat. This is the dataset employed by many in the 
previous literature although it only contains the ratings from S&P. The second 
                                                 
5 In this thesis, “corporate bond credit-yield curve” refers to the chart of average corporate 




dataset consists of the corporate bonds issuance ratings from S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch provided by SDC Platinum. Regression analysis based on both 
datasets confirm the hypothesis that credit ratings are higher given a steep 
corporate bond credit-yield curve after controlling firm and issue level 
characteristics as well as industry or firm fixed effects. Such time-varying 
rating standards suggest that CRAs' incentive problems are more serious 
during the period when bonds market investors are more risk-averse. However, 
we should interpret the results with a caveat that the conclusion might not 
apply to other types of credit ratings such as the ratings for structured credit 
products. Compared with corporate bonds, the credit risk embedded in the 
structured credit products is much more difficult to analyse and the rating 
process for such products are also quite different.  
As a comparison, I conduct the same analysis using the probabilities of default 
(PDs) released by the Credit Research Initiative (CRI) of Risk Management 
Institute (RMI) at National University of Singapore. The RMI-CRI system 
adopts an open platform, making public with technical details, and the access 
to the results is freely available.  The regression results based on such 
objectively constructed PDs are totally different from those based on credit 
ratings from for-profit credit rating agencies and serve as a sharp comparison.  
Employing a similar logic, we could also argue that credit ratings may be 
deflated as well if the potential reputation loss is too large and bond credit-
yield curve is flat. However, such rating deflation would only happen if the 
potential reputation loss is large, the default probability of the firm is high and 
CRAs cannot accurately evaluate the project's credit risk. If the firm is 
engaged in some complicated business which is hard to analyse for the credit 
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analysts at CRAs and the default probability is high, the CRAs are likely to 
assign a more conservative rating in order to avoid mistakes and keep a good 
reputation. In reality, however, corporate default is a rare event and it is 
relatively easy to evaluate the credit risk of corporate bonds compared with 
structured credit products. Therefore, we could conjecture that the relationship 
between corporate bond credit-yield curve and rating standards is asymmetric. 
Credit ratings are inflated when the credit-yield curve is steep but rating 
deflation would not take place given a flat credit-yield curve. The empirical 
analysis is consistent with the asymmetric hypothesis and provides little 
evidence for rating deflation. 
We can also derive testable implications regarding the cross-sectional 
difference of the relationship between rating standards and corporate bond 
credit-yield curve. I find that the sensitivity of credit ratings on the slope of 
corporate bond credit-yield curve is higher for complex firms whose credit 
risk is more difficult to analyse. The intuition behind this phenomenon is that 
CRAs could attribute the inflated ratings to the complex business that firms 
are engaged in rather than their distorted incentives. And the reputation loss 
would not be too large in case such complex firms with inflated ratings default. 
The analysis also reveals two countervailing mechanisms regarding the cross-
sectional difference of rating sensitivity on corporate bond credit-yield curve 
among issuers with different credit risks. On one hand, the slope of corporate 
bond credit-yield curve is usually higher for issues with low credit ratings. 
Therefore, risky firms are more concerned of their ratings and the additional 
issuance cost will be much higher for such firms if the ratings assigned to 
them are lower than expectation. As a result, CRAs are more likely to inflate 
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the ratings for companies with higher credit risk. On the other hand, however, 
CRAs are expected to be relatively more conservative with respect to risky 
firms because reputation is still a concern to some extent knowing that such 
risky firms are more likely to default and result in reputation damages to 
CRAs. The empirical study lends support to the former hypothesis that rating 
sensitivity on the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve is higher for firms 
with high credit risk. These findings on the cross-sectional difference of rating 
standards reinforce the argument that reputation concerns are not always 
powerful enough to discipline the CRAs. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 derives the testable 
hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the dataset as well as the measures used in the 
empirical study. Chapter 4 reports the major empirical results, and Chapter 5 
concludes.   
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Chapter 2. Hypothesis Development 
 
In this chapter, I derive several hypotheses which will be tested directly in the 
empirical studies. A theoretical model is established in the appendix, which 
formalizes the trade-off for a CRA between the expected compensation from 
rating new bond issuances and the reputation cost in case that firms with 
inflated ratings default. The theoretical model could lead to the entire 
hypotheses developed in this chapter.  
The most important argument of this thesis is that credit rating standards are 
time-varying. The CRAs are more likely to loosen the rating standards and 
inflate ratings if the return requested by investors for risky bonds is much 
higher than that for bonds with low credit risk. When corporate bond credit-
yield curve is steep, firms would be burdened with much higher bond issuance 
cost if they cannot solicit high ratings from CRAs. If CRAs still stick to the 
normal rating standards, firms are more likely to delay the investment projects 
or refer to other channels to raise capital. Bearing such potential loss in mind, 
CRAs will have stronger incentives to inflate ratings so as to insure their 
income from rating fees. Therefore, credit ratings will be higher during the 
period with steep corporate bond credit-yield curve after controlling the firm 
level characteristics, if the reputation concerns are not strong enough to 
discipline the CRAs. 
Employing the same logic, the CRAs may tighten the rating standards and 
deflate the ratings when the corporate bond credit-yield curve is flat. Under 
such regime, firms can still afford the return required by investors even if they 
obtain low ratings. Accordingly, reputation concerns might outweigh the 
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worries on loss of rating fees. And CRAs will have stronger incentives to 
tighten their rating standards and accumulate good reputation. Such 
mechanism would reinforce the argument that credit ratings are time-varying 
and proportional to the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve.  
Hypothesis 1. Holding firm level characteristics constant, credit ratings are 
higher due to lax rating standards when the corporate bond credit-yield curve 
is steep, but lower given a flat credit-yield curve. 
The above analysis demonstrates that CRAs may have incentives to tighten the 
rating standards and deflate credit ratings given a flat corporate bond credit-
yield curve. However, such rating deflation would only occur if the following 
three conditions are satisfied. First, the reputation loss in case of defaults 
should be very large. Second, the CRAs cannot accurately evaluate the firms' 
credit risk. And lastly, firms’ default probabilities are high. In reality, however, 
corporate default is always a rare event and the credit risk of corporate bonds 
is much easier to evaluate than other types of credit products. Several recent 
studies find that corporate defaults can be predicted quite accurately using 
reduced form models6. Cantor and Mann (2003) reach the same conclusion 
using the credit ratings from Moody's. Therefore, rating deflation is unlikely to 
happen in real practice and the impact of the slope of corporate bond credit-
yield curve on rating standards could be asymmetric.  
Hypothesis 2. The impact of the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve on 
rating standards is asymmetric. Credit ratings are inflated when the credit-
                                                 
6 See, for example, Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), Duffie, Saita, and Wang 
(2007), Bharath and Shumway (2008), Duan, Sun, and Wang (2012). 
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yield curve is steep but CRAs would not deflate the ratings when the credit-
yield curve is flat. 
The analyses so far focus on the time-series dynamics of rating standards. 
Next, we can also derive several hypotheses regarding the cross-sectional 
variation of credit ratings.  
During the period with steep corporate bond credit-yield curve, CRAs are 
more prone to inflate the ratings of complex firms since the future 
performance of such companies are more difficult to forecast. Even if such 
companies default in the future, the CRAs could blame the inflated ratings on 
the complexity of the firms' business and therefore reduce their reputation loss 
to the minimum. As a consequence, the sensitivity of credit ratings on the 
slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve should be higher for such complex 
companies. It should be noted that the hypothesis is corresponding to the 
interactive impact of firms’ complexity and the slope of corporate bond credit-
yield curve on credit ratings rather than the first order relation between credit 
ratings and firms’ complexity. And the empirical analysis will focus on such 
interactive effect as well. 
Hypothesis 3. The sensitivity of credit ratings on the slope of corporate bond 
credit-yield curve is higher for complex firms whose credit risk is more 
difficult to evaluate. Credit ratings for such complex companies are inflated 
more compared with other firms given a steep corporate bond credit-yield 
curve. 
Next, I try to analyse whether the sensitivity of credit ratings on the slope of 
corporate bond credit-yield curve is higher for firms with high credit risk or 
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those with low risk. On one hand, the slope of the corporate bond credit-yield 
curve is usually not constant but decreasing with credit ratings in practice7. 
Therefore, if the assigned ratings are lower than expected, the additional bond 
issuance cost would be higher for more risky firms than less risky ones. As 
discussed previously, the CRAs thus have stronger incentives to inflate the 
ratings for those more risky firms in order to secure their rating fees. On the 
other hand, if reputation is still a concern for CRAs to some extent, we should 
observe a lower sensitivity of credit ratings on the slope of corporate bond 
credit-yield curve for the risky firms since they are more likely to default and 
lead to a reputation cost for the CRAs. In other words, CRAs would be more 
conservative and less likely to inflate the ratings for firms with higher default 
probabilities to avoid potential reputation loss.  
Hypothesis 4A. The credit ratings of risky firms are more sensitive to the 
slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve. 
Hypothesis 4B. The credit ratings of risky firms are less sensitive to the slope 
of corporate bond credit-yield curve. 
  
                                                 
7 See figure 5 in Longstaff, Mithal and Neis(2005) for example 
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Chapter 3. Data and Measures 
 
The sample period is 1985 to 2011. I obtain the credit ratings from Compustat. 
The rating data include both the S&P’s long term issuer credit ratings and 
S&P’s short term issuer credit ratings. The sample for short term issuer credit 
ratings is much smaller because only the large firms with access to 
commercial paper market have such short term ratings. The empirical analyses 
thus focus on the long term issuer credit ratings, like most of the previous 
literature. Similar to the previous literature, I employ only one rating data each 
year for each firm. I follow the convention to convert rating categories to 
numerical scores in the following way: 1=AAA, 2=AA, ……, 19=CCC-, 
20=CC. For short term issuer ratings, 1=A-1+, 2=A-1, 3=A-2, 4=A-3, 5=B, 
6=below B8. Same as previous literature, I exclude utility (SIC between 4900 
and 4999) and financial firms (SIC between 6000 and 6999) from the sample9. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of credit ratings on annual basis. For ease of 
presentation, firms are classified by ratings without modifiers as shown in this 
table. For example, the AA category consists of firms rated as AA+, AA, and 
AA-.   
To examine the relationship between the slope of corporate bond credit-yield 
curve and rating standards, I employ the yield spread between corporate bonds 
                                                 
8 In 2004, S&P expanded the B rating category by dividing it into B-1, B-2, and B-3. However, 
I combine these three subcategories and assign the same sore to them. 
9 I also conduct robustness tests by including utility and financial firms since those firms are 
frequent issuers of corporate bonds. Financial firms are usually quite different from other 
types of firms in terms of the capital structure. So I replace leverage ratios by distance-to-
default in the regression. Distance-to-default is a volatility adjusted measure for leverage. I got 
this measure from the Credit Research Database provided by the Risk Management Institute 
of National University of Singapore. The way they compute distance-to-default already takes 
into account the different capital structure of financial firms. More details could be found in 
Risk Management Institute (2011).  The results with utility and financial firms are very similar 
and therefore not reported for brevity.  
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rated as Baa and Aaa (denoted as default spread) obtained from Federal 
Reserve as the measure for the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve. For 
each observation, I merge the rating data with default spread measured at 
previous month-end. I plot the time-series of default spread in Figure 1. 
As a comparison, I also retrieve the probabilities of default released by the 
Risk Management Institute at National University of Singapore.  The PDs are 
computed by RMI using its default prediction model (Version 2011, Update 1 
with Addendums 1-4), which is based on the forward-intensity default 
prediction methodology of Duan, Sun, and Wang (2012).   
I control several firm level variables in all of the rating regressions reported in 
the next chapter. To select the control variables, I follow both the previous 
literature and the corporate ratings criteria disclosed by major CRAs such as 
Standard & Poor's (2008). In each rating regression, I control the following 
firm level variables: (1) total non-convertible debt divided by total assets 
(Levnonconv), (2) total convertible debt divided by total assets (Levconv), (3) 
operating income after depreciation divided by interest expenses (Interest), (4) 
cash and short-term investments divided by total assets (Cash), (5) net income 
before depreciation divided by sales (Profit), (6) the log of market 
capitalization scaled by CPI index10 (Size), (7) the market to book ratio (M/B), 
(8) systematic risk (Beta), (9) idiosyncratic risk (Sigma). The systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk measures are computed according to the market model after 
accounting for infrequent trading as Dimson (1979). All the accounting data 
                                                 
10 The CPI index is from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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are from Compustat annual file11 and lagged for three months to make sure 
such information is known to the CRAs by the time the credit ratings are 
released. The systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures are calculated based 
on the previous 1-year's daily data obtained from CRSP daily file. These two 
measures are set to be missing if there are less than 50 observations from the 
daily stock file in the previous one year. 
All the control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce 
the influence of extreme values. Several previous studies including Blume, 
Lim, and Mackinlay (1998), Jorion, Shi, and Zhang (2009), Alp (2011), 
Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2012) find that issuer credit ratings are 
declining over the past thirty years. Becker and Melbourn (2011), however, 
find that rating standards are being laxer due to the increased competition in 
the rating industry. To control the potential time trend of rating standards, I 
further include a deterministic trend variable defined as 0 for 1985, 1 for 1986, 
and so on12. 
To measure the complexity of the firms' business, I also obtain the data on 
stock analysts' earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S unadjusted summary file. 
Similar to Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), I calculate the dispersion of 
analysts' opinions as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the 
absolute value of the mean earnings forecast. This dispersion measure is also 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Summary statistics of the firm level 
variables as well as the PDs from RMI are reported in Table 2. 
                                                 
11 I also conduct robustness tests using Compustat quarterly file and the results are very 
similar to the ones reported in the thesis. 
12 I conduct robustness tests using the accounting quality measure proposed by Jorion, Shi, 
and Zhang (2009) as an additional control variable and the results are very similar.  
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As a robustness check, I also obtain the corporate bond issuance ratings from 
SDC platinum global new issues database. Results based on such rating data 
are reported in the Table Appendix. Credit ratings from the largest three rating 
agencies, i.e. S&P, Moody’s and Fitch are all available in such database. 
However, the sample size for Fitch is much smaller than S&P and Moody's. 
Moreover, there is almost no observation for Fitch before 1998. As a result, I 
only report the results for S&P and Moody's for brevity. Results for Fitch are 
generally similar to those for S&P and Moody's but the statistical significance 
is usually much weaker due to the small sample size. I still follow the 
convention to convert rating categories to numerical scores in the following 
way: 1=Aaa(AAA), 2=Aa1(AA+), ……, 16=B3(B-), 17=below B3(below B-). 
Several filters are applied to the sample. Since most of the issues are senior 
debt, the subordinated ones are excluded. I also exclude utility (SIC between 
4900 and 4999) and financial firms (SIC between 6000 and 6999), issues with 
callable or puttable feature, and issues with sinking funds. Several 
observations with negative maturity or negative total assets are deleted as well.  
In addition to the firm level control variables, I also include in the regressions 
two more issue level variables obtained from SDC platinum. These two 
variables are: (1) the year to maturity (Maturity), (2) the issuance volume 




Chapter 4. Empirical Results 
 
In this chapter, I report and discuss the empirical results based on S&P’s long 
term issuer credit ratings. Results based on the issuance ratings are reported in 
the Table A1-A4. For most cases, both results are consistent although the ones 
based on issuance ratings are sometimes less statistically significant due to the 
smaller sample size. 
4.1 The Impact of Corporate bond credit-yield curve on Rating Standards 
 
To study the impact of the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve on rating 
standards, I regress credit ratings on the default spread: 
ܴܽݐ݅݊݃ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൈ ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ 
Because default spread is an economy-wide variable that varies over time but 
stays the same cross-sectionally, the above equation thus examines whether 
rating standards are time-varying. Estimations of the equation are presented in 
Table 3. Column (1) reports the results using OLS with firm level control 
variables but without any industry or firm dummy variables. The coefficient 
for the default spread is negative and significant which is consistent with 
hypothesis 1 that credit rating standards are time-varying. Column (2) reports 
the results with industry dummy variables13 to allow for omitted industry fixed 
effects while column (3) employs firm dummy variables which drive out the 
effect of industry dummy variables. CRAs always claim to incorporate firms' 
private information into their ratings. Regressions with firm dummy variables 
can sweep out time-invariant common factors within each firm and thus 
                                                 
13 Industries are classified according to two digit SIC codes 
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reduce the concerns about unobserved firm heterogeneity. The results in 
column (2) and (3) are still the same suggesting that such time-varying rating 
standards are not driven by any constant industry level or firm level omitted 
variables. Since the dependent variables are categorical rather than continuous, 
I follow the literature to employ the ordered probit model with or without 
industry dummy variables and report the results in columns (4) and (5). The 
conclusions still hold that credit ratings are higher when the corporate bond 
credit-yield curve is steep. 
Although the results so far could be interpreted as rating standards being 
stringent given a flat corporate bond credit-yield curve but laxer when the 
slope of credit-yield curve is high due to CRAs' distorted incentives, an 
alternative explanation is the “through the cycle” rating methodology 
employed by the CRAs. As stated in Standard & Poor's (2002), “the ideal is to 
rate ‘through the cycle’. There is no point in assigning high ratings to a 
company enjoying peak prosperity if that performance level is expected to be 
only temporary. Similarly, there is no need to lower ratings to reflect poor 
performance as long as one can reliably anticipate that better times are just 
around the corner.” Using the corporate issuer ratings from S&P, Altman and 
Rijken (2004) confirm that agency ratings are focused on the long term. 
Therefore it is possible that firm specific characteristics overstate a firm's long 
term credit risk during recessions but understate such credit risk during booms. 
Taking such cyclical effect into consideration, CRAs may adjust their ratings 
accordingly. The slope of the corporate bond credit-yield curve is correlated 
with macroeconomic conditions. It is usually higher during economic 
downturn but lower during economic booms (Fama and French, 1989). 
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Therefore, the “through the cycle” rating methodology might be reflected in 
my rating regressions and the results could have nothing to do with CRAs' 
incentive problems. 
However, such “rating through the cycle” explanation could only be valid for 
long term credit ratings. There is no reason for the CRAs to employ the same 
methodology to evaluate a company’s credit risk for the short run. Besides, 
several studies on reduced form credit risk models14 show that companies' 
short term credit risk is higher during recessions but lower during economic 
booms even after controlling firm-specific variables. Therefore we should 
expect the short term ratings to be lower when the slope of corporate bond 
credit-yield curve is high if credit ratings are fair evaluation of companies' 
credit risk. Table 4 reports the results from OLS regression and ordered probit 
model based on S&P’s short term issuer credit ratings. The signs of the 
coefficients are identical to Table 3 which is based on long term ratings. The 
results are inconsistent with the “rating through the cycle” explanation and 
therefore provide robust evidence to hypothesis 1 that rating standards are lax 
during the period with steep corporate bond credit-yield curve for incentive 
reasons. In addition, “rating through the cycle” could not explain other 
findings in this paper as well. 
As a comparison, I conduct additional analysis on the probabilities of default 
(PDs) provided by a non-profit credit information alternative. I employ the 
credit research infrastructure created by the Credit Research Initiative (CRI) of 
the Risk Management Institute (RMI) at the National University of Singapore. 
                                                 
14 A partial list of such studies includes Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007), Duffie, Saita, 




I retrieve the probabilities of default computed by RMI using its default 
prediction model (Version 2011, Update 1 with Addendums 1-4). The RMI-
CRI default prediction model in Version 2011 is based on the forward-
intensity default prediction model of Duan, Sun, and Wang (2012). As at the 
end of October 2012, the RMI-CRI system generates daily updated default 
predictions for around 30,000 exchange-listed firms in 46 economies in Asia-
Pacific, Europe, North America and Latin America. The RMI-CRI system 
adopts an open platform, makes the methodological details public, and grants 
free access to the PDs15. Since the RMI-CRI is a non-profit operation, it is not 
exposed to the incentive problems as other for-profit rating agencies.      
To ensure a fair comparison, I repeat the rating regression using a sub-sample 
of S&P’s long term issuer credit ratings where I could match the ratings with 
the PDs from the RMI-CRI system. The results are reported in Panel A of 
Table 5 which are very close to the results based on the whole sample. 
RMI provides PDs for individual firms on different horizons of interest. I 
choose the 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month and 24-month16 PDs and 
apply the logit transformation before conducting the regression analysis:  
݈݋݃݅ݐሺܲܦሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൈ ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ 
Results on such regression are presented in Panel B of Table 5. The PDs are 
positively correlated with default spread except for the 24-month PDs which 
are not correlated with default spread. Therefore, when the corporate bond 
credit-yield curve is steep, the RMI-CRI system would in effect issue a lower 
                                                 
15 For more information on the RMI-CRI system, please refer to Duan and van Laere (2012). 
16 24-month is the longest horizon in the RMI-CRI system by the time I retrieved the data. 
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short term rating after controlling other firm level variables, and the long term 
ratings are not directly affected by the slope of corporate bond credit-yield 
curve. This result is in line with intuition that PDs should be positively 
correlated with default spread. It contrasts sharply with the regression results 
on the S&P ratings where higher credit ratings are associated with higher 
default spread. Incentive-induced credit rating bias is fairly evident by this 
comparison study.  
4.2 The Asymmetric Impact of Corporate Bond Yield 
 
As discussed previously, the impact of the slope of corporate bond credit-yield 
curve on credit ratings can be caused by either rating inflation or rating 
deflation. In this section, I test whether both rating inflation and rating 
deflation take place in reality. To examine these two opposite effects, I 
decompose the default spread into an above-median component and a below-
median component. For example, the above-median component of default 
spread is defined to be X+=max(X-MX, 0) where X denotes the default spread 
and MX is the sample median for X. The below-median component is defined 
to be X-=min(X-MX, 0). The long term issuer credit ratings are then regressed 
on these two components: 
ܴܽݐ݅݊݃ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ ൈ ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ା ൅ ߚଶ ൈ ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ି ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ 
The coefficient for the above-median component is supposed to be negative if 
rating inflation takes place. On the other hand, if CRAs deflate the ratings 
given a flat corporate bond credit-yield curve, we should expect the 
coefficients for the below-median component of default spread to be negative.  
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Panel A of Table 6 reports the estimation results from OLS and ordered probit 
models. The above-median component of default spread is estimated to have 
negative and significant effects on credit ratings. Therefore, the results provide 
strong evidence for rating inflation. On the other hand, however, there is little 
evidence in line with the existence of rating deflation. The coefficients of the 
below-median component of default spread are statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, Table 6 Panel A provides strong evidence consistent with 
hypothesis 2 that the impact of the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve 
on rating standards is asymmetric. The reputation concerns are not powerful 
enough to discipline the CRAs when the corporate bond credit-yield curve is 
steep, which leads to rating inflation. But there are no incentives for the CRAs 
to deflate ratings when the corporate bond credit-yield curve is flat. 
The above regression analysis assumes a linear relationship between credit 
ratings and default spread, which might be an unrealistic simplification and 
bias our evaluation for the economic significance of the results. To handle 
such issue, I re-estimate the rating regression taking credit ratings as a step 
function of default spread. I further divide default spread into deciles and 
define five dummy variables corresponding to the highest five deciles. The 
parameter estimates based on OLS and ordered probit are reported in panel B 
of table 6. Credit ratings are significantly inflated when default spread falls in 
the highest decile compared with the other four deciles. When default spread 
is extremely high, credit ratings are inflated by more than a half notch based 
on column (1) and (2). If we take firm fixed effects into consideration as 
shown in column (3), ratings are still estimated to be inflated by more than a 
quarter notch when default spread falls in the highest decile.  Such significant 
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changes of rating standards demonstrate the economic significance of the 
results. 
4.3 Analyst Forecasts Dispersion 
 
The next two sections focus on examining the cross-sectional variation of 
credit rating standards. According to hypothesis 3, the sensitivity of credit 
ratings on the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve is higher for complex 
firms whose credit risk is more difficult to evaluate. I employ the stock 
analysts' earnings forecasts dispersion to measure the complexity of the firms' 
business. The earnings forecasts dispersion is computed as the standard 
deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean 
earnings forecast as in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002). Then I regress 
ratings on the cross product of default spread and the dispersion of stock 
analysts' opinions:  
ܴܽݐ݅݊݃ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൈ ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊ ൈ ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൅ ߛ ൈ ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀
൅ ߜ ൈ ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ 
Table 7 reports the parameter estimates from OLS and ordered probit models. 
The coefficients for the cross products of forecasts dispersion and default 
spread are statistically significant for all the columns. The results provide 
strong evidence in line with hypothesis 3 that credit ratings are inflated more 
for complex companies when corporate bond credit-yield curve is steep. Such 
cross-sectional feature of the credit ratings, again, suggests that the CRAs 
cannot always be self-disciplined by the reputation concerns.  
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One may argue that the dispersion of stock analysts' earnings forecasts could 
be a biased measure of the company's complexity from the view of credit 
analysts at CRAs. However, the role of complexity is to disguise the poor 
rating performance. Therefore, we should choose a complexity measure from 
out-siders’ perspective, which could serves as an excuse for CRAs to inflate 
the ratings. And stock analysts' forecasts dispersion is precisely such a 
measure.   
4.4 Credit Risk 
 
As discussed before, there could be two countervailing mechanisms that 
influence the rating sensitivity for risky firms on the slope of corporate bond 
credit-yield curve. This section thus provides the empirical evidence regarding 
which mechanism dominates. I regress credit ratings on the cross product of 
default spread and proxy for firms' individual credit risk.  
ܴܽݐ݅݊݃ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൈ ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൈ ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൅ ߛ ൈ ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ	ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൅ ߜ
ൈ ܴ݅ݏ݇ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ 
I employ three different measures for firms' credit risk and all these measures 
are significant determinants of firms' credit ratings in the previous regression 
analysis. The first measure is the ratio of firms' total non-convertible debt to 
total assets. A company's leverage ratio is probably the most important 
determinant for its default probability and such solvency ratios have been 
widely used in the credit risk literature. Another measure used is the net 
income before depreciation divided by sales. A firm's ultimate existence is 
based on the profitability of its business and such profitability measure is 
therefore expected to be closely related to the firm's credit risk. The last 
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measure I employ is the idiosyncratic volatility. If a company has more 
variable cash flows and hence more variable stock returns, then the firm ought 
to have a higher probability of default or bankruptcy17.  
Table 8 presents the parameter estimates. For brevity, I only report the results 
based on ordered probit models. The signs of the coefficients for all the 
interactive terms are consistent with hypothesis 5A that CRAs are more likely 
to inflate the ratings for companies with high credit risk given a steep 
corporate bond credit-yield curve. The parameter estimates are always 
statistically significant for the cross product of default spread and credit risk 
measures. Such findings reinforce our argument on the distorted incentives of 
credit rating agencies.  
  
                                                 
17 I also conduct robustness tests using the PDs provided by RMI-CRI system as the measure 
for credit risk, the results are still the same. 
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Chapter 5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Despite their critical roles in modern financial system, CRAs have been 
widely criticized for not fulfilling their responsibilities and releasing biased 
credit assessments to investors. At the heart of such criticism lies the issuer-
pay business model, which leads to the conflicts of interest and grants the 
CRAs distorted incentives to inflate credit ratings in order to appease their 
clients. This thesis adds to the literature by providing new evidence on 
whether CRAs could be self-disciplined by reputation concerns. I argue that 
credit rating standards will be time-varying if reputation concerns are not 
powerful enough to neutralize the incentive to inflate credit ratings. CRAs are 
more likely to inflate the ratings when the corporate bond credit-yield curve is 
steep. The empirical studies, based on more than twenty years' data on credit 
ratings, confirm the time-varying feature of rating standards. Although I find 
that credit ratings are inflated when corporate bond credit-yield curve is steep, 
there is little evidence that CRAs inflate or deflate ratings when default spread 
is small. Therefore, the impact of corporate bond credit-yield curve on rating 
standards is asymmetric. Besides the time-series pattern, I also analyse the 
cross-sectional variation of credit ratings. The CRAs are more likely to inflate 
the credit ratings for complex and risky companies. Such types of firms would 
distort the CRAs' incentives more seriously and make the credit ratings more 
sensitive to the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve. Such cross-
sectional features of credit rating standards reinforce the argument that 




This study sheds light on the discussion regarding CRAs' incentives to fairly 
reveal information under the issuer-pay model and provides justifications for 
the reform of the rating industry through either the regulatory route or a more 
fundamental approach of overhauling the for-profit credit rating business 
model by adding a public-good alternative as described in Duan and van Laere 
(2012). My findings also raise a further question on how the time-varying 
pattern of rating standards would affect companies' financial policies. Kisgen 
(2006, 2009), Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman (2009) as well as the survey 
study of Graham and Harvey (2001) demonstrated that credit ratings have 
direct influence on firms' financial policies such as capital structure and 
dividend pay-outs. It will be natural to expect inflated ratings to have real 
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This appendix sets up a simple theoretical model which develops the entire 
hypothesis as stated in the main text.  
I consider an economy with three types of agents: a firm (or issuer), a 
monopolistic credit rating agency (CRA)18, and investors. The CRA is risk 
neutral and risk free rate is normalized to be zero. 
At the beginning of the game, the firm intends to issue corporate bonds in 
order to finance a new project. The quality of the project can either be good 
(denoted as q=g) with prior probability 0.5 or bad (denoted as q=b) with prior 
probability 0.5 as well. The type-g project will always succeed but the type-b 
project may fail with probability p. 
The quality of the project is only known to the firm insiders. Outside investors 
are not able to tell the difference between a good project and a bad project. 
Such asymmetric information problem creates the need for CRA, a financial 
intermediation which reduces the asymmetric information between issuers and 
investors by releasing the credit rating. A good credit rating may allow the 
issuers to finance the projects at better terms. 
The return of the corporate bond required by the investors depends on the 
quality of the project. If the investors believe the project to be type-g, the 
required return is equal to risk free rate rg=0 since the good project will never 
fail and there is no credit risk at all. On the other hand, if the investors believe 
that the quality of the project is bad, they would require a positive return rb>0 
                                                 
18 The organizational structure of the credit rating industry is not critical to the following 
analysis since the model is not focused on the competition among different CRAs. 
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due to the credit risk of type-b project and investors' risk aversion. rb measures 
the difference of return requested by the investors for risky project and safe 
project. The value of rb depends on the degree of corporate bond market 
investors' risk aversion which is usually time-varying. To make the model 
simple, I assume rb to be exogenous instead of modelling the investors' 
decision making process. 
At the beginning of the credit rating process, the firm approaches the CRA to 
request for a shadow rating which will not be issued to the public unless the 
firm finally decides to make the bond issuance and pay the rating fee I. Such 
setting of shadow rating process is consistent with the industry practice that 
issuers can purchase an indicative or private rating, along with advice 
regarding how the company might qualify for higher rating prior to being 
issued a public rating. The CRA can obtain a signal sє{G,B} of the quality of 
the project at no cost19 by performing due diligence and interviewing with the 
firm's management team. The signal is characterized by its precision θ as 
follows 
ܲሺݏ ൌ ܩ|ݍ ൌ ݃ሻ ൌ ܲሺݏ ൌ ܤ|ݍ ൌ ܾሻ ൌ ߠ 
ܲሺݏ ൌ ܤ|ݍ ൌ ݃ሻ ൌ ܲሺݏ ൌ ܩ|ݍ ൌ ܾሻ ൌ 1 െ ߠ 
θ measures the CRA's rating technology as well as the complexity of the 
project. If θ=0.5, the signal reveals no information and the CRA's posterior 
belief regarding the project's quality is same as the prior belief. I assume that 
the signal is informative and 0.5<θ≤1. 
                                                 
19 It is not critical to allow for a cost to obtain the signal. 
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The CRA can issue either a good rating or a bad rating. Investors are assumed 
to be trusting in the sense that they always believe the CRA to truthfully rate 
the project and take the ratings at face value.20 Therefore, if the firm obtains a 
good rating from the CRA, the return of the bond requested by the investors is 
rg=0. Otherwise, the firm needs to offer a return of rb so as to attract the 
investors and finance the project. The maximum return the firm could afford is 
rmax. If the return required by the investors exceeds rmax, the firm would cancel 
the issuance. In that case, the rating will not be issued to the public and the 
CRA wouldn't receive the rating fee. Firms are heterogeneous with different 
rmax. The CRA doesn't know the exact value21 of rmax and believes that rmax has 
a distribution with distribution function F(·) and density function f(·). F(0)=0, 
therefore the firm will always make the issuance and pay the rating fee if it 
can solicit a good rating from the CRA. If the CRA assigns a bad rating, the 
firm may still make the issuance and pay the rating fee with probability 1-F(rb). 
If the firm obtains a good rating from the CRA but the project fails, the CRA 
would incur a reputation loss with present value c. Without such reputation 
concerns, the CRA would always issue good ratings in order to secure the 
income from rating fees. I follow Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) to 
assume the reputation loss c to be exogenous to make the model simple and 
tractable. The CRA can either issue a rating solely based on the signal 
                                                 
20 Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) consider a model with both trusting and sophisticated 
investors. Sophisticated investors understand the CRA’s potential conflicts of interest and 
wouldn’t take the ratings at face value. However, CRA’s incentive to inflate the ratings is 
based on the existence of trusting investors. If all investors are sophisticated, then the CRA 
will always tell the truth in their model. Strobl and Xia (2012) conduct empirical analysis and 
find little evidence that investors are sophisticated enough to be aware of CRA’s incentive to 
issue inflated credit ratings. 
21 It could also be the case that the firm would reveal the maximum return they could offer to 
the investors in order to bargain for a higher rating. However, the CRA can hardly verify 
whether such information revealed by the issuing company is true or not. 
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received or cheat to increase its expected payoff. For simplicity, I assume that 
the CRA will always tell the truth if it is indifferent between truth-telling and 
cheating. I consider the CRA's decision making process in the following two 
cases: 
Case 1: s=G 
Using the Bayes rule, the posterior probability is 
ܲሺݍ ൌ ݃|ݏ ൌ ܩሻ ൌ ܲሺݍ ൌ ݃ሻܲሺݏ ൌ ܩ|ݍ ൌ ݃ሻܲሺݍ ൌ ݃ሻܲሺݏ ൌ ܩ|ݍ ൌ ݃ሻ ൅ ܲሺݍ ൌ ܾሻܲሺݏ ൌ ܩ|ݍ ൌ ܾሻ
ൌ ߠ 
ܲሺݍ ൌ ܾ|ݏ ൌ ܩሻ ൌ 1 െ ܲሺݍ ൌ ݃|ݏ ൌ ܩሻ ൌ 1 െ ߠ																																																 
The above derivation takes into account the assumption that prior probability 
for good and bad projects are both 0.5. If the CRA issues a good rating, its 
expected payoff would be 
ߨ௚ ൌ ܫ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݌ܿ 
In this case, the CRA would always receive the rating fee I. However, the 
quality of the project might be bad with probability 1-θ and the CRA will 
incur a reputation loss c if the project fails with probability p. On the other 
hand, if the CRA issues a bad rating, the expected payoff is 
ߨ௕ ൌ ܫሾ1 െ ܨሺݎ௕ሻሿ 
The probability that the CRA can receive the rating fee is 1-F(rb). There would 
not be any reputation loss even if the project is type-b and fails. The CRA 




ܿ ൑ Φଵ ൌ ܫܨሺݎ
௕ሻ
ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݌ 
If the reputation loss is too large such that c>Φ1, then the CRA will mislead by 
deflating the rating. It should be noted that the CRA will always tell the truth 
if the quality of the project can be perfectly observed (θ=1) or the failure 
probability is low (p=0). However, if the project is very risky and hard to 
evaluate, and the reputation cost is high, then the CRA may have the 
incentives to deflate the rating in order to keep a good reputation. 
Case 2: s=B 
The posterior probability can be similarly derived using the Bayes rule 
ܲሺݍ ൌ ݃|ݏ ൌ ܤሻ ൌ 1 െ ߠ 
ܲሺݍ ൌ ܾ|ݏ ൌ ܤሻ ൌ ߠ 
If the CRA lies about the bad signal and issues a good rating, the expected 
payoff is πg=I-θpc. On the other hand, if the CRA tells the truth then the 
payoff is πb=I[1-F(b)]. And the truth-telling condition is now 
ܿ ൒ Φଶ ൌ ܫܨሺݎ
௕ሻ
ߠ݌  
The reputation concerns cannot discipline the CRA, if the reputation loss is 
not large enough such that c<Φ2. And the rating is inflated in that case. This is 
widely known as the “conflicts of interest” problem with the CRAs created by 
the issuer-pay business model. The major results of the model are summarized 
in the following proposition: 





ߠ݌ ൑ ܿ ൑
ܫܨሺݎ௕ሻ
ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݌ ൌ Φଵ 
The CRA would inflate the rating if c<Φ2 but deflate the rating if c>Φ1. Since 
θ is assumed to be larger than 0.5, Φ2 is always less than Φ1 and the truth-
telling condition is not an empty set. 
The most important implication of the model is that credit rating standards is 
time-varying. From proposition 1, the threshold value Φ2 is increasing with rb 
which measures the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve. Such positive 
relationship between Φ2 and rb implies that CRAs are more likely to loosen the 
rating standards and inflate ratings if the return requested by investors for 
risky bonds is much higher than that for bonds with low credit risk.  
On the other hand, the threshold value Φ1 from proposition 1 is increasing with 
rb which indicates that CRAs may tighten the rating standards and deflate the 
ratings when the corporate bond credit-yield curve is flat.  
Hypothesis 1. Holding firm level characteristics constant, credit ratings are 
higher due to lax rating standards when the corporate bond credit-yield curve 
is steep, but lower given a flat credit-yield curve. 
The model demonstrates that CRAs may have incentives to tighten the rating 
standards and deflate credit ratings during economic booms. However, such 
rating deflation would only occur if the CRAs cannot accurately evaluate the 
firms' credit risk and default probabilities are high. Otherwise, the discounted 
value of reputation loss would be trivial after taking 1-θ and p into account. In 
reality, corporate default is always a rare event and the credit risk of corporate 
bonds is much easier to evaluate than other types of credit products. Therefore, 
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rating deflation is unlikely to happen in real practice. And the impact of the 
slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve on rating standards could be 
asymmetric.  
Hypothesis 2. The impact of the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve on 
rating standards is asymmetric. Credit ratings are inflated when the credit-
yield curve is steep but CRAs would not deflate the ratings when the credit-
yield curve is flat. 
From proposition 1, we can derive the second order derivative of the threshold 
value Φ2 with respect to the precision of the signal θ and return requested by 




ߠଶ݌ ൏ 0 
This formula implies that the sensitivity of credit ratings on the slope of 
corporate bond credit-yield curve is higher for companies whose credit risk is 
more difficult to evaluate.  
Hypothesis 3. The sensitivity of credit ratings on the slope of corporate bond 
credit-yield curve is higher for complex firms whose credit risk is more 
difficult to evaluate. Credit ratings for such complex companies are inflated 
more compared with other firms given a steep corporate bond credit-yield 
curve. 
To analyse whether the sensitivity of credit ratings on the slope of corporate 
bond credit-yield curve is higher for firms with high credit risk or those with 
low risk, we can derive two opposite implications from the model. The 
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conclusion is ambiguous and thus turns out to be an empirical question. On 
one hand, the slope of the corporate bond credit-yield curve is usually not 
constant but decreasing with credit ratings in practice22 . Therefore, if the 
assigned ratings are lower than expected, the additional bond issuance cost 
would be higher for more risky firms than less risky ones. As discussed 
previously, the CRAs thus have stronger incentives to inflate the ratings for 
those more risky issuers in order to secure their rating fees. On the other hand, 
if we derive the second order derivative of the threshold value Φ2 with respect 




݌ଶߠ ൏ 0 
Such inequality suggests that credit ratings for risky firms are less sensitive to 
the slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve. In other words, CRAs would be 
more conservative and less likely to inflate the ratings for firms with higher 
default probabilities to avoid potential reputation loss. 
Hypothesis 4A. The credit ratings of risky firms are more sensitive to the 
slope of corporate bond credit-yield curve. 
Hypothesis 4B. The credit ratings of risky firms are less sensitive to the slope 
of corporate bond credit-yield curve. 
 
                                                 
22 See figure 5 in Longstaff, Mithal and Neis(2005) for example 
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Table 1: Number of Credit Ratings by Year and Rating Category 
 
This table contains the distribution of credit ratings over time. The ratings are 
the S&P’s long term issuer credit ratings retrieved from Compustat. For ease 
of presentation, firms are classified by ratings without modifiers. 
 
Year AAA AA A BBB BB 
Below 
BB Total 
1985 1 2 11 5 7 15 41 
1986 19 71 172 113 128 174 677 
1987 19 68 159 134 156 222 758 
1988 20 67 160 116 139 203 705 
1989 22 57 163 118 130 168 658 
1990 20 61 151 125 119 139 615 
1991 20 60 153 136 114 114 597 
1992 18 64 159 150 131 112 634 
1993 17 60 165 165 151 132 690 
1994 15 60 168 190 194 136 763 
1995 16 59 172 203 193 150 793 
1996 16 54 196 225 223 187 901 
1997 16 57 206 252 255 213 999 
1998 14 59 214 286 311 252 1136 
1999 13 59 203 307 322 271 1175 
2000 14 49 189 329 316 273 1170 
2001 12 40 189 327 301 292 1161 
2002 12 36 174 352 311 257 1142 
2003 11 33 170 317 329 237 1097 
2004 11 31 169 320 337 261 1129 
2005 10 31 172 318 353 236 1120 
2006 10 30 170 291 336 252 1089 
2007 10 30 149 281 321 268 1059 
2008 10 28 134 265 308 266 1011 
2009 7 28 127 259 275 276 972 
2010 5 29 126 259 259 269 947 
2011 5 26 118 254 258 241 902 





Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of firm level variables. Levnonconv is 
total non-convertible debt divided by total assets, Levconv is total convertible 
debt divided by total assets, Interest is operating income after depreciation 
divided by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-term investments divided 
by total assets, Profit is net income before depreciation divided by sales, Size 
is the log of market capitalization scaled by CPI index, M/B is the market to 
book ratio, Beta and Sigma are systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures 
from the market model after accounting for infrequent trading as in Dimson 
(1979), Dispersion is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the 
absolute value of the mean earnings forecasts. All the above variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. PD1, PD3, PD6, PD12 and PD24 are the 
probabilities of default corresponding to different horizons (1-month, 3-month, 
6-month, 12-month and 24-month). The PDs are provided by Risk 
Management Institute at National University of Singapore. 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
Levnonconv 23941 0.32 0.21 0.18 0.29 0.43 
Levconv 23941 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Interest 23941 6.37 11.31 1.39 3.31 6.84 
Cash 23941 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.11 
Profit 23941 0.17 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.23 
Size 23941 2.24 1.82 1.01 2.24 3.46 
M/B 23941 1.60 0.80 1.10 1.36 1.82 
Beta 23941 1.05 0.61 0.64 0.99 1.39 
Sigma 23941 2.50 1.39 1.55 2.11 3.00 
Dispersion 20357 0.21 0.49 0.03 0.06 0.16 
PD1 15221 0.05% 0.32% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 
PD3 15221 0.14% 0.71% 0.00% 0.01% 0.06% 
PD6 15221 0.27% 1.12% 0.01% 0.03% 0.14% 
PD12 15221 0.50% 1.59% 0.03% 0.10% 0.35% 





Table 3: The Impact of Corporate Bond Credit-Yield Curve on Rating 
Standards 
 
This table presents the impact of corporate bond credit-yield curve on rating 
standards from OLS and ordered probit models. The dependent variables are 
rating scores converted from S&P's long term issuer credit ratings. Default 
Spread is the yield spread between Baa and Aaa, Levnonconv is total non-
convertible debt divided by total assets, Levconv is total convertible debt 
divided by total assets, Interest is operating income after depreciation divided 
by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-term investments divided by total 
assets, Profit is net income before depreciation divided by sales, Size is the log 
of market capitalization scaled by CPI index, M/B is the market to book ratio, 
Beta and Sigma are systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures from the 
market model after accounting for infrequent trading as in Dimson (1979). 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are clustered by firm. * 
denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes 
significance at 1%. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.434*** -0.380*** -0.195*** -0.221*** -0.203*** 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.017) (0.017) 
Levnonconv 3.016*** 2.744*** 2.137*** 1.670*** 1.576*** 
(0.200) (0.203) (0.226) (0.103) (0.107) 
Levconv 6.332*** 5.826*** 2.743*** 3.283*** 3.159*** 
(0.403) (0.384) (0.377) (0.217) (0.212) 
Interest -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.016*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash 3.098*** 2.686*** 1.644*** 1.713*** 1.539*** 
(0.336) (0.308) (0.270) (0.168) (0.161) 
Profit 0.002 -0.929*** -0.637*** -0.173 -0.763*** 
(0.233) (0.251) (0.240) (0.121) (0.136) 
Size -1.218*** -1.255*** -1.129*** -0.597*** -0.650*** 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.045) (0.017) (0.019) 
M/B 0.052 0.118** 0.313*** 0.032 0.067*** 
(0.051) (0.047) (0.041) (0.025) (0.024) 
Beta 0.830*** 0.801*** 0.393*** 0.407*** 0.414*** 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.028) (0.019) (0.018) 
Sigma 0.369*** 0.289*** 0.090*** 0.243*** 0.206*** 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) 
Trend 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.134*** 0.070*** 0.073*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 23941 23941 23941 23941 23941 
R-sq 0.721 0.742 0.917 
pseudo R-sq 0.241 0.256 
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Table 4: The Impact of Corporate Bond Credit-Yield Curve on Rating 
Standards (Short Term Ratings) 
 
This table presents the impact of corporate bond credit-yield curve on rating 
standards from OLS and ordered probit models. The dependent variables are 
rating scores converted from S&P's short term issuer credit ratings. Default 
Spread is the yield spread between Baa and Aaa, Levnonconv is total non-
convertible debt divided by total assets, Levconv is total convertible debt 
divided by total assets, Interest is operating income after depreciation divided 
by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-term investments divided by total 
assets, Profit is net income before depreciation divided by sales, Size is the log 
of market capitalization scaled by CPI index, M/B is the market to book ratio, 
Beta and Sigma are systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures from the 
market model after accounting for infrequent trading as in Dimson (1979). 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are clustered by firm. * 
denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes 
significance at 1%. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.176*** -0.157*** -0.092*** -0.284*** -0.269*** 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.037) (0.038) 
Levnonconv 1.436*** 1.427*** 1.259*** 2.154*** 2.249*** 
(0.211) (0.195) (0.179) (0.344) (0.339) 
Levconv 4.980*** 4.800*** 3.522*** 7.505*** 7.606*** 
(0.823) (0.844) (0.805) (1.270) (1.380) 
Interest -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.002** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash 0.163 0.122 0.480* -0.013 -0.122 
(0.257) (0.252) (0.254) (0.426) (0.439) 
Profit -0.167 -0.847*** -1.179*** -0.231 -1.364*** 
(0.212) (0.269) (0.276) (0.346) (0.466) 
Size -0.287*** -0.291*** -0.382*** -0.469*** -0.500*** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) 
M/B -0.145*** -0.112*** 0.003 -0.255*** -0.223*** 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.044) (0.050) 
Beta 0.360*** 0.357*** 0.189*** 0.546*** 0.571*** 
(0.035) (0.032) (0.026) (0.055) (0.053) 
Sigma 0.225*** 0.190*** 0.091*** 0.341*** 0.297*** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.040) (0.042) 
Trend 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.094*** 0.100*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 7712 7712 7712 7712 7712 
R-sq 0.477 0.521 0.791 
pseudo R-sq 0.245 0.279 
46 
 
Table 5: Comparison Analysis Using RMI PDs 
 
This table presents the results for a comparison analysis using the probabilities 
of default provided by Risk Management Institute at National University of 
Singapore. Panel A reports the regression results based on S&P’s long term 
issuer credit ratings from a matched sample while Panel B are based on RMI 
PDs. Default Spread is the yield spread between Baa and Aaa, Levnonconv is 
total non-convertible debt divided by total assets, Levconv is total convertible 
debt divided by total assets, Interest is operating income after depreciation 
divided by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-term investments divided 
by total assets, Profit is net income before depreciation divided by sales, Size 
is the log of market capitalization scaled by CPI index, M/B is the market to 
book ratio, Beta and Sigma are systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures 
from the market model after accounting for infrequent trading as in Dimson 
(1979). PD1, PD3, PD6, PD12 and PD24 are the probabilities of default 
corresponding to different horizons (1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 12-month 
and 24-month).. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are 
clustered by firm. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 




Panel A: S&P’s Long Term Issuer Credit Ratings (Matched Sample) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.657*** -0.586*** -0.262*** -0.386*** -0.368*** 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) 
Levnonconv 2.518*** 2.227*** 1.663*** 1.526*** 1.396*** 
(0.238) (0.229) (0.250) (0.129) (0.130) 
Levconv 5.436*** 4.772*** 2.069*** 2.994*** 2.779*** 
(0.453) (0.430) (0.413) (0.262) (0.260) 
Interest -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.017*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash 3.807*** 3.346*** 1.386*** 2.181*** 2.011*** 
(0.374) (0.360) (0.329) (0.200) (0.204) 
Profit 0.095 -0.980*** -0.834*** -0.167 -0.895*** 
(0.268) (0.293) (0.282) (0.147) (0.173) 
Size -1.123*** -1.159*** -1.032*** -0.587*** -0.652*** 
(0.040) (0.034) (0.051) (0.023) (0.024) 
M/B -0.068 -0.016 0.262*** -0.019 0.010 
(0.059) (0.052) (0.045) (0.031) (0.030) 
Beta 0.796*** 0.757*** 0.390*** 0.414*** 0.422*** 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022) 
Sigma 0.407*** 0.322*** 0.074*** 0.287*** 0.250*** 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) 
Trend 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.147*** 0.095*** 0.100*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 15221 15221 15221 15221 15221 
R-sq 0.726 0.754 0.927 






Panel B: RMI PDs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
logit(PD1) logit(PD3) logit(PD6) logit(PD12) Logit(PD24) 
Default Spread 0.793*** 0.689*** 0.558*** 0.405*** 0.008 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.021) (0.017) 
Levnonconv 3.270*** 3.045*** 2.795*** 2.376*** 1.707*** 
(0.213) (0.200) (0.183) (0.157) (0.127) 
Levconv 3.122*** 2.869*** 2.604*** 2.160*** 1.434*** 
(0.338) (0.313) (0.286) (0.245) (0.206) 
Interest -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Cash -3.048*** -3.354*** -3.265*** -3.258*** -2.863*** 
(0.277) (0.258) (0.236) (0.203) (0.171) 
Profit -0.070 -0.035 -0.043 -0.044 -0.060 
(0.195) (0.182) (0.167) (0.145) (0.124) 
Size 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.121*** 0.095*** 0.049** 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.028) (0.023) 
M/B -0.707*** -0.609*** -0.528*** -0.372*** -0.167*** 
(0.044) (0.041) (0.038) (0.034) (0.028) 
Beta 0.102*** 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.044** -0.008 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.017) 
Sigma 0.957*** 0.913*** 0.842*** 0.737*** 0.586*** 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016) 
Trend -0.039*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.062*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Firm Dummy Y Y Y Y Y 
N 15221 15221 15221 15221 15221 





Table 6: The Asymmetric Impact of Corporate Bond Credit-Yield Curve 
on Rating Standards 
 
This table presents the asymmetric impact of the slope of corporate bond 
credit-yield curve on rating standards from OLS and ordered probit models. 
The dependent variables are rating scores converted from S&P's long term 
issuer credit ratings. Default Spread is the yield spread between Baa and Aaa, 
Levnonconv is total non-convertible debt divided by total assets, Levconv is total 
convertible debt divided by total assets, Interest is operating income after 
depreciation divided by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-term 
investments divided by total assets, Profit is net income before depreciation 
divided by sales, Size is the log of market capitalization scaled by CPI index, 
M/B is the market to book ratio, Beta and Sigma are systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk measures from the market model after accounting for 
infrequent trading as in Dimson (1979). In Panel A, default spread is 
decomposed into an above-median component (with a superscript “+”) and a 
below-median component (with a superscript “-”). For example, X+=max(X-
MX, 0) and X-=min(X-MX, 0) where MX is the sample median of X. In Panel B, 
default spread is further divided into deciles and five dummy variables 
denoted by DS90-100, DS80-90, DS70-80, DS60-70 and DS50-60 are defined 
corresponding to the highest five deciles. Standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses and are clustered by firm. * denotes significance at 10%, ** 




Panel A: Measures Based on Median 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread+ -0.478*** -0.432*** -0.240*** -0.255*** -0.243*** 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) 
Default Spread- -0.177 -0.073 0.111 -0.022 0.032 
 (0.137) (0.134) (0.115) (0.070) (0.070) 
Levnonconv 3.015*** 2.742*** 2.130*** 1.670*** 1.576*** 
(0.200) (0.203) (0.226) (0.103) (0.107) 
Levconv 6.328*** 5.823*** 2.741*** 3.281*** 3.158*** 
(0.403) (0.384) (0.377) (0.216) (0.212) 
Interest -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.016*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash 3.081*** 2.666*** 1.612*** 1.701*** 1.525*** 
(0.337) (0.309) (0.270) (0.169) (0.162) 
Profit -0.001 -0.934*** -0.641*** -0.175 -0.768*** 
(0.233) (0.251) (0.240) (0.121) (0.137) 
Size -1.218*** -1.255*** -1.130*** -0.596*** -0.650*** 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.045) (0.017) (0.019) 
M/B 0.054 0.120** 0.318*** 0.033 0.069*** 
(0.051) (0.047) (0.041) (0.025) (0.024) 
Beta 0.826*** 0.795*** 0.387*** 0.404*** 0.410*** 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.028) (0.019) (0.018) 
Sigma 0.371*** 0.291*** 0.091*** 0.245*** 0.208*** 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) 
Trend 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.133*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 23941 23941 23941 23941 23941 
R-sq 0.721 0.742 0.917 





Panel B: Measures Based on Deciles 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
DS90-100 -0.575*** -0.509*** -0.260*** -0.286*** -0.264*** 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.049) (0.029) (0.030) 
DS80-90 0.028 0.056 0.061** 0.017 0.032 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.029) (0.019) (0.020) 
DS70-80 -0.212*** -0.164*** -0.009 -0.094*** -0.074** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.042) (0.028) (0.029) 
DS60-70 -0.113*** -0.091*** -0.037 -0.036** -0.027 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) 
DS50-60 0.038 0.065 0.159** 0.055 0.082 
 (0.102) (0.094) (0.065) (0.052) (0.050) 
Levnonconv 3.027*** 2.754*** 2.137*** 1.673*** 1.580*** 
(0.200) (0.203) (0.226) (0.103) (0.107) 
Levconv 6.322*** 5.814*** 2.726*** 3.269*** 3.147*** 
(0.403) (0.385) (0.378) (0.216) (0.212) 
Interest -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.016*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash 3.116*** 2.696*** 1.616*** 1.716*** 1.538*** 
(0.338) (0.310) (0.270) (0.169) (0.162) 
Profit -0.016 -0.954*** -0.643*** -0.182 -0.777*** 
(0.234) (0.251) (0.241) (0.121) (0.137) 
Size -1.224*** -1.260*** -1.135*** -0.598*** -0.652*** 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.045) (0.018) (0.019) 
M/B 0.063 0.129*** 0.326*** 0.038 0.074*** 
(0.051) (0.047) (0.041) (0.025) (0.024) 
Beta 0.831*** 0.799*** 0.390*** 0.405*** 0.411*** 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.028) (0.019) (0.018) 
Sigma 0.351*** 0.273*** 0.076*** 0.234*** 0.198*** 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) 
Trend 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.132*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 23941 23941 23941 23941 23941 
R-sq 0.721 0.742 0.917 





Table 7: The Impact of Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
 
This table presents the impact of analyst forecast dispersion and the slope of 
corporate bond credit-yield curve on rating standards from OLS and ordered 
probit models. The dependent variables are rating scores converted from 
S&P's long term issuer credit ratings. Default Spread is the yield spread 
between Baa and Aaa, Dispersion is the standard deviation of earnings 
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast, Levnonconv 
is total non-convertible debt divided by total assets, Levconv is total convertible 
debt divided by total assets, Interest is operating income after depreciation 
divided by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-term investments divided 
by total assets, Profit is net income before depreciation divided by sales, Size 
is the log of market capitalization scaled by CPI index, M/B is the market to 
book ratio, Beta and Sigma are systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures 
from the market model after accounting for infrequent trading as in Dimson 
(1979). Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are clustered by 
firm. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.340*** -0.306*** -0.118*** -0.176*** -0.165*** 
× Dispersion (0.054) (0.054) (0.042) (0.030) (0.032) 
Default Spread -0.422*** -0.362*** -0.178*** -0.225*** -0.204*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.031) (0.019) (0.020) 
Dispersion 0.823*** 0.720*** 0.240*** 0.466*** 0.422*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.056) (0.042) (0.044) 
Levnonconv 3.189*** 2.926*** 2.258*** 1.784*** 1.696*** 
(0.210) (0.213) (0.254) (0.111) (0.116) 
Levconv 6.278*** 5.680*** 2.840*** 3.361*** 3.190*** 
(0.420) (0.398) (0.392) (0.232) (0.229) 
Interest -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash 3.110*** 2.765*** 1.749*** 1.783*** 1.648*** 
(0.337) (0.320) (0.297) (0.175) (0.174) 
Profit 0.033 -0.811*** -0.565** -0.171 -0.746*** 
(0.244) (0.267) (0.279) (0.131) (0.151) 
Size -1.221*** -1.256*** -1.150*** -0.611*** -0.668*** 
(0.033) (0.031) (0.049) (0.019) (0.021) 
M/B 0.051 0.109** 0.318*** 0.034 0.065*** 
(0.050) (0.046) (0.044) (0.026) (0.025) 
Beta 0.810*** 0.794*** 0.426*** 0.421*** 0.440*** 
(0.040) (0.037) (0.031) (0.021) (0.020) 
Sigma 0.424*** 0.338*** 0.087*** 0.269*** 0.230*** 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) 
Trend 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.139*** 0.077*** 0.081*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 20357 20357 20357 20357 20357 
R-sq 0.719 0.742 0.915 





Table 8: The Impact of Credit Risk 
 
This table presents the impact of credit risk and the slope of corporate bond 
credit-yield curve on rating standards from OLS and ordered probit models. 
The dependent variables are rating scores converted from S&P's long term 
issuer credit ratings. Default Spread is the yield spread between Baa and Aaa, 
Levnonconv is total non-convertible debt divided by total assets, Levconv is total 
convertible debt divided by total assets, Interest is operating income after 
depreciation divided by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-term 
investments divided by total assets, Profit is net income before depreciation 
divided by sales, Size is the log of market capitalization scaled by CPI index, 
M/B is the market to book ratio, Beta and Sigma are systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk measures from the market model after accounting for 
infrequent trading as in Dimson (1979). Standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses and are clustered by firm. * denotes significance at 10%, ** 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.419*** -0.416***     
× Levnonconv (0.083) (0.085)     
Default Spread   0.314*** 0.284***   
× Profit   (0.101) (0.104)   
Default Spread     -0.076*** -0.077*** 
× Sigma     (0.009) (0.010) 
Default Spread -0.084*** -0.067** -0.275*** -0.252*** 0.029 0.049 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) (0.033) (0.034) 
Levnonconv 2.073*** 1.974*** 1.669*** 1.575*** 1.664*** 1.567*** 
(0.133) (0.137) (0.103) (0.107) (0.103) (0.107) 
Levconv 3.281*** 3.157*** 3.277*** 3.154*** 3.260*** 3.141*** 
(0.217) (0.212) (0.216) (0.212) (0.217) (0.213) 
Interest -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.016*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash 1.698*** 1.526*** 1.711*** 1.538*** 1.679*** 1.507*** 
(0.168) (0.162) (0.168) (0.161) (0.168) (0.161) 
Profit -0.169 -0.759*** -0.485*** -1.047*** -0.165 -0.755*** 
(0.121) (0.136) (0.175) (0.187) (0.120) (0.136) 
Size -0.598*** -0.651*** -0.597*** -0.650*** -0.598*** -0.652*** 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
M/B 0.035 0.070*** 0.032 0.067*** 0.032 0.067*** 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Beta 0.411*** 0.419*** 0.408*** 0.415*** 0.416*** 0.423*** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Sigma 0.244*** 0.208*** 0.243*** 0.206*** 0.325*** 0.290*** 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) 
Trend 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.074*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry Dummy  Y  Y  Y 
N 23941 23941 23941 23941 23941 23941 







Table A1: The Impact of Corporate Bond Credit-Yield Curve on Rating 
Standards (Corporate Bond Issuance Ratings) 
 
This table presents the impact of corporate bond credit-yield curve on rating 
standards from OLS and ordered probit models. Panel A reports the results 
based on Moody's sample while Panel B is based on S&P's sample. For each 
panel, columns (1)-(5) report the results for the whole sample while column (6) 
is based on a sub-sample consisting of issues with maturity no more than 1 
year. The dependent variables are rating scores converted from corporate bond 
issuance ratings. Default Spread is the yield spread between Baa and Aaa, 
Levnonconv is total non-convertible debt divided by total assets, Levconv is total 
convertible debt divided by total assets, Interest is operating income after 
depreciation divided by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-term 
investments divided by total assets, Profit is net income before depreciation 
divided by sales, Size is the log of market capitalization scaled by CPI index, 
M/B is the market to book ratio, Beta and Sigma are systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk measures from the market model after accounting for 
infrequent trading as in Dimson (1979), Proceeds is the total amount of 
issuance divided by total assets, Maturity is the year to maturity of the bond. 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are clustered by firm. * 
denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes 




Panel A: Moody’s Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.573*** -0.547*** -0.132** -0.315*** -0.326*** -0.613* 
 (0.102) (0.081) (0.060) (0.055) (0.047) (0.370) 
Levnonconv 2.020*** 2.266*** 1.906*** 0.887*** 1.125*** 6.248*** 
 (0.568) (0.429) (0.512) (0.299) (0.251) (2.360) 
Levconv 8.673*** 6.915*** 4.723*** 4.433*** 3.882*** 32.427 
 (1.447) (1.312) (1.598) (0.779) (0.774) (20.031) 
Interest -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.107* 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.055) 
Cash 2.945*** 3.134*** 2.519*** 1.250*** 1.475*** 10.283* 
(0.786) (0.707) (0.808) (0.420) (0.411) (5.409) 
Profit 0.153 -1.528*** -1.816*** 0.091 -0.940*** -2.849* 
(0.580) (0.466) (0.594) (0.297) (0.271) (1.666) 
Size -0.895*** -1.029*** -0.811*** -0.477*** -0.595*** -0.842*** 
(0.068) (0.057) (0.097) (0.042) (0.039) (0.240) 
M/B -0.434*** -0.314*** -0.069 -0.237*** -0.185*** 0.117 
(0.063) (0.065) (0.078) (0.039) (0.040) (0.230) 
Beta 0.619*** 0.582*** 0.211** 0.316*** 0.320*** 0.820* 
(0.098) (0.092) (0.100) (0.052) (0.054) (0.485) 
Sigma 0.617*** 0.427*** 0.190*** 0.299*** 0.227*** 0.549*** 
(0.070) (0.055) (0.055) (0.037) (0.033) (0.172) 
Proceeds 4.212*** 2.711*** 1.118*** 1.830*** 1.231*** 4.619 
(0.506) (0.439) (0.395) (0.261) (0.260) (5.948) 
Maturity 0.001 -0.006 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.254 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.825) 
Trend 0.191*** 0.188*** 0.148*** 0.100*** 0.108*** 0.263*** 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.048) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y Y 
Firm Dummy   Y    
N 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 200 
R-sq 0.710 0.758 0.918    





Panel B: S&P’s Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.672*** -0.637*** -0.221*** -0.361*** -0.371*** -0.717 
 (0.111) (0.089) (0.064) (0.059) (0.051) (0.497) 
Levnonconv 2.314*** 2.543*** 1.698*** 1.010*** 1.248*** 5.564** 
 (0.645) (0.480) (0.486) (0.346) (0.280) (2.705) 
Levconv 8.318*** 6.683*** 5.354*** 4.048*** 3.551*** 71.677 
 (1.584) (1.381) (1.516) (0.833) (0.783) (58.082) 
Interest -0.033*** -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.087 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.078) 
Cash 2.136** 2.656*** 1.621** 0.898** 1.258*** 20.63*** 
(0.850) (0.758) (0.815) (0.447) (0.432) (6.062) 
Profit -0.447 -2.031*** -1.306* -0.233 -1.156*** -0.525 
(0.659) (0.546) (0.752) (0.337) (0.306) (2.204) 
Size -0.805*** -0.941*** -0.855*** -0.411*** -0.519*** -0.382* 
(0.070) (0.061) (0.092) (0.042) (0.038) (0.223) 
M/B -0.448*** -0.323*** -0.039 -0.242*** -0.191*** 0.112 
(0.064) (0.070) (0.086) (0.038) (0.042) (0.343) 
Beta 0.622*** 0.614*** 0.247*** 0.312*** 0.331*** 1.140** 
(0.099) (0.091) (0.092) (0.050) (0.052) (0.529) 
Sigma 0.646*** 0.459*** 0.217*** 0.312*** 0.241*** 0.922*** 
(0.074) (0.058) (0.060) (0.038) (0.034) (0.225) 
Proceeds 4.306*** 2.853*** 1.116*** 1.822*** 1.245*** -4.785 
(0.522) (0.450) (0.404) (0.256) (0.255) (5.884) 
Maturity -0.002 -0.009** -0.004* -0.000 -0.004* -1.000 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (1.144) 
Trend 0.190*** 0.186*** 0.155*** 0.096*** 0.102*** 0.218*** 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.054) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y Y 
Firm Dummy   Y    
N 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 199 
R-sq 0.686 0.735 0.916    





Table A2: The Asymmetric Impact of Corporate Bond Credit-Yield 
Curve on Rating Standards (Corporate Bond Issuance Ratings) 
 
This table presents the asymmetric impact of corporate bond credit-yield curve 
on rating standards from OLS and ordered probit models. Panel A and C 
report the results based on Moody's sample while Panel B and D are based on 
S&P's sample. The dependent variables are rating scores converted from 
corporate bond issuance ratings. Default Spread is the yield spread between 
Baa and Aaa, Levnonconv is total non-convertible debt divided by total assets, 
Levconv is total convertible debt divided by total assets, Interest is operating 
income after depreciation divided by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-
term investments divided by total assets, Profit is net income before 
depreciation divided by sales, Size is the log of market capitalization scaled by 
CPI index, M/B is the market to book ratio, Beta and Sigma are systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk measures from the market model after accounting for 
infrequent trading as in Dimson (1979), Proceeds is the total amount of 
issuance divided by total assets, Maturity is the year to maturity of the bond. 
In Panel A and B, default spread is decomposed into an above-median 
component (with a superscript “+”) and a below-median component (with a 
superscript “-”). For example, X+=max(X-MX, 0) and X-=min(X-MX, 0) where 
MX is the sample median of X. In Panel C and D, default spread is further 
divided into deciles and five dummy variables denoted by DS90-100, DS80-
90, DS70-80, DS60-70 and DS50-60 are defined corresponding to the highest 
five deciles.Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are clustered 
by firm. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** 




Panel A: Moody’s Sample (Measures Based on Median) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread+ -0.677*** -0.649*** -0.178*** -0.358*** -0.378*** 
(0.106) (0.090) (0.061) (0.056) (0.049) 
Default Spread- 0.044 0.089 0.203 -0.059 -0.007 
 (0.377) (0.348) (0.306) (0.198) (0.202) 
Levnonconv 1.987*** 2.230*** 1.869*** 0.875*** 1.110*** 
(0.569) (0.429) (0.518) (0.299) (0.251) 
Levconv 8.602*** 6.837*** 4.623*** 4.408*** 3.849*** 
(1.448) (1.316) (1.597) (0.780) (0.777) 
Interest -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.016*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash 2.893*** 3.074*** 2.434*** 1.230*** 1.447*** 
(0.789) (0.710) (0.814) (0.421) (0.412) 
Profit 0.161 -1.529*** -1.818*** 0.093 -0.942*** 
(0.575) (0.463) (0.593) (0.296) (0.270) 
Size -0.899*** -1.035*** -0.812*** -0.479*** -0.598*** 
(0.068) (0.057) (0.097) (0.042) (0.039) 
M/B -0.428*** -0.305*** -0.063 -0.235*** -0.180*** 
(0.064) (0.066) (0.080) (0.039) (0.040) 
Beta 0.604*** 0.564*** 0.202* 0.310*** 0.312*** 
(0.098) (0.092) (0.104) (0.052) (0.055) 
Sigma 0.623*** 0.433*** 0.192*** 0.302*** 0.230*** 
(0.070) (0.055) (0.055) (0.036) (0.033) 
Trend 4.191*** 2.688*** 1.090*** 1.825*** 1.223*** 
(0.501) (0.436) (0.395) (0.260) (0.259) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 
R-sq 0.711 0.759 0.918 





Panel B: S&P’s Sample (Measures Based on Median) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread+ -0.747*** -0.719*** -0.242*** -0.384*** -0.405*** 
(0.119) (0.099) (0.067) (0.061) (0.054) 
Default Spread- -0.216 -0.114 -0.065 -0.220 -0.156 
 (0.387) (0.379) (0.287) (0.198) (0.215) 
Levnonconv 2.289*** 2.513*** 1.680*** 1.004*** 1.238*** 
(0.648) (0.482) (0.490) (0.347) (0.281) 
Levconv 8.258*** 6.611*** 5.305*** 4.032*** 3.525*** 
(1.584) (1.380) (1.505) (0.833) (0.783) 
Interest -0.033*** -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.014*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash 2.100** 2.607*** 1.585* 0.888** 1.240*** 
(0.857) (0.762) (0.816) (0.450) (0.435) 
Profit -0.443 -2.033*** -1.308* -0.232 -1.158*** 
(0.655) (0.543) (0.752) (0.336) (0.305) 
Size -0.808*** -0.945*** -0.856*** -0.412*** -0.521*** 
(0.070) (0.061) (0.092) (0.042) (0.038) 
M/B -0.444*** -0.317*** -0.037 -0.241*** -0.188*** 
(0.065) (0.070) (0.086) (0.039) (0.042) 
Beta 0.611*** 0.599*** 0.243*** 0.308*** 0.325*** 
(0.099) (0.091) (0.094) (0.050) (0.053) 
Sigma 0.650*** 0.464*** 0.218*** 0.314*** 0.243*** 
(0.074) (0.058) (0.060) (0.038) (0.034) 
Trend 4.293*** 2.836*** 1.103*** 1.820*** 1.240*** 
(0.519) (0.449) (0.405) (0.256) (0.254) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 
R-sq 0.687 0.735 0.916 





Panel C: Moody’s Sample (Measures Based on Deciles) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
DS90-100 -0.699*** -0.722*** -0.215** -0.388*** -0.431*** 
(0.147) (0.125) (0.096) (0.080) (0.075) 
DS80-90 -0.278** -0.277*** -0.119 -0.159*** -0.168*** 
 (0.111) (0.105) (0.098) (0.058) (0.061) 
DS70-80 -0.400*** -0.368*** -0.213** -0.237*** -0.231*** 
 (0.124) (0.109) (0.095) (0.068) (0.065) 
DS60-70 -0.117 -0.127 -0.115 -0.078 -0.082 
 (0.112) (0.095) (0.077) (0.059) (0.055) 
DS50-60 0.188 0.193 0.066 0.101 0.119* 
 (0.135) (0.121) (0.090) (0.073) (0.070) 
Levnonconv 2.006*** 2.248*** 1.885*** 0.878*** 1.113*** 
(0.573) (0.432) (0.518) (0.301) (0.252) 
Levconv 8.617*** 6.834*** 4.643*** 4.397*** 3.832*** 
(1.464) (1.328) (1.600) (0.786) (0.782) 
Interest -0.037*** -0.027*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.016*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash 2.986*** 3.162*** 2.563*** 1.273*** 1.492*** 
(0.797) (0.717) (0.814) (0.426) (0.417) 
Profit 0.121 -1.578*** -1.851*** 0.073 -0.968*** 
(0.582) (0.468) (0.591) (0.299) (0.273) 
Size -0.910*** -1.046*** -0.827*** -0.485*** -0.605*** 
(0.069) (0.058) (0.097) (0.042) (0.039) 
M/B -0.418*** -0.298*** -0.066 -0.229*** -0.176*** 
(0.064) (0.066) (0.077) (0.039) (0.040) 
Beta 0.612*** 0.569*** 0.211** 0.312*** 0.313*** 
(0.099) (0.093) (0.103) (0.053) (0.055) 
Sigma 0.599*** 0.412*** 0.187*** 0.289*** 0.217*** 
(0.070) (0.055) (0.055) (0.036) (0.033) 
Trend 4.189*** 2.666*** 1.080*** 1.810*** 1.200*** 
(0.508) (0.442) (0.394) (0.264) (0.263) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 
R-sq 0.710 0.758 0.918 





Panel D: S&P’s Sample (Measures Based on Deciles) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
DS90-100 -0.882*** -0.882*** -0.372*** -0.476*** -0.516*** 
(0.154) (0.126) (0.091) (0.081) (0.072) 
DS80-90 -0.328*** -0.319*** -0.176* -0.175*** -0.185*** 
 (0.111) (0.103) (0.091) (0.057) (0.058) 
DS70-80 -0.473*** -0.431*** -0.297*** -0.275*** -0.267*** 
 (0.127) (0.113) (0.094) (0.067) (0.064) 
DS60-70 -0.256** -0.255** -0.235*** -0.148** -0.154*** 
 (0.119) (0.104) (0.079) (0.062) (0.059) 
DS50-60 0.071 0.115 -0.038 0.020 0.049 
 (0.138) (0.128) (0.092) (0.072) (0.072) 
Levnonconv 2.313*** 2.539*** 1.701*** 1.006*** 1.244*** 
(0.652) (0.484) (0.486) (0.349) (0.282) 
Levconv 8.272*** 6.606*** 5.264*** 4.014*** 3.501*** 
(1.602) (1.400) (1.513) (0.840) (0.793) 
Interest -0.034*** -0.025*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.014*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash 2.188** 2.689*** 1.697** 0.932** 1.285*** 
(0.864) (0.768) (0.813) (0.453) (0.436) 
Profit -0.480 -2.083*** -1.333* -0.249 -1.183*** 
(0.663) (0.549) (0.744) (0.339) (0.307) 
Size -0.822*** -0.960*** -0.881*** -0.420*** -0.530*** 
(0.071) (0.062) (0.091) (0.042) (0.038) 
M/B -0.435*** -0.311*** -0.037 -0.236*** -0.185*** 
(0.065) (0.070) (0.084) (0.039) (0.042) 
Beta 0.625*** 0.610*** 0.259*** 0.314*** 0.330*** 
(0.100) (0.092) (0.092) (0.051) (0.053) 
Sigma 0.621*** 0.438*** 0.205*** 0.297*** 0.228*** 
(0.074) (0.058) (0.059) (0.038) (0.034) 
Trend 4.290*** 2.808*** 1.078*** 1.807*** 1.217*** 
(0.526) (0.454) (0.404) (0.259) (0.257) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 
R-sq 0.685 0.735 0.916 





Table A3: The Impact of Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
 (Corporate Bond Issuance Ratings) 
 
This table presents the impact of analyst forecast dispersion and corporate 
bond credit-yield curve on rating standards from OLS and ordered probit 
models. Panel A reports the results based on Moody's sample while Panel B is 
based on S&P's sample. The dependent variables are rating scores converted 
from corporate bond issuance ratings. Default Spread is the yield spread 
between Baa and Aaa, Dispersion is the standard deviation of earnings 
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast, Levnonconv 
is total non-convertible debt divided by total assets, Levconv is total convertible 
debt divided by total assets, Interest is operating income after depreciation 
divided by interest expenses, Cash is cash and short-term investments divided 
by total assets, Profit is net income before depreciation divided by sales, Size 
is the log of market capitalization scaled by CPI index, M/B is the market to 
book ratio, Beta and Sigma are systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures 
from the market model after accounting for infrequent trading as in Dimson 
(1979), Proceeds is the total amount of issuance divided by total assets, 
Maturity is the year to maturity of the bond. Standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses and are clustered by firm. * denotes significance at 10%, ** 




Panel A: Moody’s Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.794*** -0.597** -0.315 -0.450*** -0.376** 
× Dispersion (0.266) (0.265) (0.278) (0.145) (0.161) 
Default Spread -0.442*** -0.440*** -0.103* -0.248*** -0.267*** 
 (0.100) (0.076) (0.060) (0.057) (0.047) 
Dispersion 1.827*** 1.365*** 0.811* 0.998*** 0.831*** 
 (0.348) (0.355) (0.432) (0.189) (0.212) 
Levnonconv 2.221*** 2.484*** 2.035*** 1.004*** 1.263*** 
(0.585) (0.446) (0.545) (0.317) (0.269) 
Levconv 8.478*** 6.862*** 4.968*** 4.481*** 3.986*** 
(1.378) (1.309) (1.643) (0.776) (0.802) 
Interest -0.032*** -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.015*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash 2.312*** 2.695*** 2.507*** 0.975** 1.295*** 
(0.784) (0.728) (0.845) (0.432) (0.435) 
Profit 0.068 -1.563*** -1.748*** 0.047 -0.958*** 
(0.579) (0.470) (0.587) (0.305) (0.280) 
Size -0.868*** -1.007*** -0.809*** -0.479*** -0.600*** 
(0.070) (0.058) (0.098) (0.044) (0.040) 
M/B -0.424*** -0.307*** -0.065 -0.239*** -0.187*** 
(0.064) (0.066) (0.079) (0.040) (0.041) 
Beta 0.614*** 0.607*** 0.223** 0.318*** 0.340*** 
(0.099) (0.093) (0.100) (0.054) (0.056) 
Sigma 0.605*** 0.430*** 0.185*** 0.301*** 0.233*** 
(0.070) (0.056) (0.054) (0.038) (0.034) 
Trend 5.269*** 3.609*** 1.499*** 2.408*** 1.766*** 
(0.546) (0.475) (0.466) (0.277) (0.276) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 7430 7430 7430 7430 7430 
R-sq 0.706 0.754 0.914 





Panel B: S&P’s Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.763** -0.564* -0.252 -0.416** -0.339* 
× Dispersion (0.306) (0.291) (0.287) (0.163) (0.174) 
Default Spread -0.543*** -0.532*** -0.201*** -0.298*** -0.317*** 
 (0.116) (0.091) (0.068) (0.064) (0.054) 
Dispersion 1.793*** 1.342*** 0.734* 0.937*** 0.773*** 
 (0.380) (0.371) (0.426) (0.203) (0.219) 
Levnonconv 2.440*** 2.672*** 1.751*** 1.088*** 1.337*** 
(0.671) (0.503) (0.512) (0.370) (0.302) 
Levconv 8.116*** 6.665*** 5.458*** 4.084*** 3.672*** 
(1.534) (1.396) (1.544) (0.844) (0.824) 
Interest -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.013*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash 1.456* 2.150*** 1.504* 0.608 1.053** 
(0.864) (0.782) (0.840) (0.467) (0.456) 
Profit -0.522 -2.007*** -1.230 -0.284 -1.162*** 
(0.658) (0.554) (0.765) (0.345) (0.318) 
Size -0.774*** -0.910*** -0.866*** -0.407*** -0.515*** 
(0.072) (0.063) (0.093) (0.044) (0.039) 
M/B -0.445*** -0.327*** -0.032 -0.249*** -0.200*** 
(0.064) (0.071) (0.086) (0.039) (0.044) 
Beta 0.625*** 0.649*** 0.271*** 0.315*** 0.353*** 
(0.100) (0.092) (0.091) (0.052) (0.054) 
Sigma 0.627*** 0.459*** 0.211*** 0.312*** 0.248*** 
(0.073) (0.060) (0.060) (0.039) (0.036) 
Trend 5.374*** 3.781*** 1.381*** 2.417*** 1.804*** 
(0.559) (0.481) (0.477) (0.274) (0.271) 
Industry Dummy  Y   Y 
Firm Dummy   Y   
N 7381 7381 7381 7381 7381 
R-sq 0.680 0.729 0.910 





Table A4: The Impact of Credit Risk 
 (Corporate Bond Issuance Ratings) 
 
This table presents the impact of analyst forecast dispersion and corporate 
bond credit-yield curve on rating standards from OLS and ordered probit 
models. Panel A reports the results based on Moody's sample while Panel B is 
based on S&P's sample. The dependent variables are rating scores converted 
from corporate bond issuance ratings. Default Spread is the yield spread 
between Baa and Aaa, Levnonconv is total non-convertible debt divided by total 
assets, Levconv is total convertible debt divided by total assets, Interest is 
operating income after depreciation divided by interest expenses, Cash is cash 
and short-term investments divided by total assets, Profit is net income before 
depreciation divided by sales, Size is the log of market capitalization scaled by 
CPI index, M/B is the market to book ratio, Beta and Sigma are systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk measures from the market model after accounting for 
infrequent trading as in Dimson (1979), Proceeds is the total amount of 
issuance divided by total assets, Maturity is the year to maturity of the bond. 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are clustered by firm. * 
denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes 




Panel A: Moody’s Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.304 -0.385     
× Levnonconv (0.340) (0.296)     
Default Spread   0.884*** 0.719***   
× Profit   (0.334) (0.268)   
Default Spread     -0.185*** -0.188*** 
× Sigma     (0.048) (0.052) 
Default Spread -0.242** -0.225** -0.517*** -0.486*** 0.101 0.102 
 (0.110) (0.096) (0.086) (0.081) (0.125) (0.123) 
Levnonconv 1.015* 1.385*** 0.766** 1.051*** 0.724** 1.018*** 
(0.541) (0.425) (0.305) (0.247) (0.311) (0.249) 
Levconv 4.200*** 3.706*** 4.177*** 3.701*** 4.190*** 3.716*** 
(0.780) (0.776) (0.784) (0.773) (0.790) (0.781) 
Interest -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.015*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash 1.510*** 1.619*** 1.494*** 1.605*** 1.384*** 1.508*** 
(0.416) (0.408) (0.419) (0.408) (0.420) (0.410) 
Profit 0.113 -0.979*** -0.764 -1.686*** 0.124 -0.970*** 
(0.302) (0.274) (0.521) (0.422) (0.302) (0.273) 
Size -0.554*** -0.653*** -0.556*** -0.655*** -0.557*** -0.656*** 
(0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033) 
M/B -0.173*** -0.140*** -0.176*** -0.142*** -0.182*** -0.149*** 
(0.042) (0.038) (0.043) (0.038) (0.043) (0.039) 
Beta 0.278*** 0.297*** 0.278*** 0.296*** 0.293*** 0.315*** 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) 
Sigma 0.334*** 0.248*** 0.333*** 0.247*** 0.530*** 0.448*** 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.062) (0.061) 
Trend 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.103*** 0.110*** 0.103*** 0.111*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Industry Dummy  Y  Y  Y 
N 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 





Panel B: S&P’s Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit 
Default Spread -0.245 -0.385     
× Levnonconv (0.393) (0.340)     
Default Spread   1.202*** 1.040***   
× Profit   (0.380) (0.312)   
Default Spread     -0.187*** -0.199*** 
× Sigma     (0.048) (0.051) 
Default Spread -0.305** -0.269** -0.633*** -0.600*** 0.061 0.087 
 (0.126) (0.109) (0.085) (0.082) (0.131) (0.127) 
Levnonconv 1.085* 1.513*** 0.903*** 1.190*** 0.849** 1.145*** 
(0.638) (0.497) (0.350) (0.274) (0.361) (0.280) 
Levconv 3.813*** 3.366*** 3.766*** 3.341*** 3.800*** 3.381*** 
(0.838) (0.787) (0.853) (0.793) (0.850) (0.793) 
Interest -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.013*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash 1.143*** 1.386*** 1.106** 1.351*** 1.014** 1.272*** 
(0.439) (0.429) (0.444) (0.431) (0.449) (0.435) 
Profit -0.210 -1.203*** -1.406** -2.231*** -0.199 -1.192*** 
(0.338) (0.305) (0.582) (0.472) (0.340) (0.304) 
Size -0.489*** -0.579*** -0.493*** -0.581*** -0.492*** -0.582*** 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) 
M/B -0.176*** -0.144*** -0.179*** -0.146*** -0.185*** -0.154*** 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) 
Beta 0.276*** 0.309*** 0.277*** 0.309*** 0.291*** 0.327*** 
(0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.053) 
Sigma 0.349*** 0.265*** 0.348*** 0.265*** 0.547*** 0.477*** 
(0.038) (0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.063) (0.061) 
Trend 0.099*** 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Industry Dummy  Y  Y  Y 
N 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 7594 
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